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Name: Arce, Julio 
NY SID: 
DIN: 92-A-9982 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Facility: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Woodbourne CF 
09~119-18 B 
Appearances: Patti J. Leibowitz, Esq. 
548 Broadway 
Monticello, New York 12701 
Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Davis. 
who particiJ?ated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived January 18, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole "Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
---==---=tF..-....;.=~F=n: ~e ~dersig~d determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~'B~'t/4~~~~··  _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sepafjte fi9~ings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 5k;.J119 tfc". 
/ I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Collll.sel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and made in violation of applicable legal authority; (2) the Board did not provide 
sufficient weight to Appellant’s programming, certain COMPAS scores, family support, release 
plans, educational and other achievements; (3) certain issues were not fully expanded upon during 
the interview; (4) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; (5) the 
Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process rights; (6) the Board’s decision 
lacked sufficient detail; and (7) the Board’s decision was predetermined. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
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the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
As to legal authority asserted by Appellant in his brief, we note that the changes made to 
Executive Law §259-c by Chapter 62 of the Laws of 2011 repealed the requirement for the 
establishment of written guidelines, and provided instead the requirement that the Board was to 
implement procedures incorporating risk and needs principles.  Appellant also asserts that the 
Board’s decision “must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 NYCRR Section 
8006.3(b).”  However, the preponderance of evidence standard only applies to parole rescission 
and final revocation decisions, which is not the case here.  
          As to the third issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Arce, Julio DIN: 92-A-9982
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.: 09-119-18 B
Findings: (Page 3 of 4)
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the fourth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray 
v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence as a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of 
Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State 
parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected 
liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 
N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
As to the sixth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
As to the seventh issue, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to judges 
and administrative fact-finders.  See People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 
A.D.2d 914 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to have followed applicable statutory 
requirements and internal policies when making decisions regarding the suitability of an inmate’s 
possible release to parole supervision. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).  There is no evidence 
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that the Board’s decision was predetermined.  See Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 
A.D.2d 899 (3d Dept. 2000).   
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
